China warily watches the US Presidential Transition

Hong Kong, November 18 : China watched the US elections on 5 November with as much interest as in any other part of the world. Bilateral relations between Beijing and Washington DC are fraught, and China officially maintained a neutral position on which candidate it wanted to win.
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said Beijing would continue to engage "under the principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation."
However, before polling results were announced, the party mouthpiece Xinhua was already reflecting antipathy towards the USA in general, referring to the election as "political turmoil" that "revealed the state of American democracy."
Sino-US ties deteriorated sharply during Trump's previous presidency, as he instigated a trade war. His position has not changed this time around, with accusations of intellectual property rights theft and unfair trade practices continuing.
Trump's 2017 National Security Strategy declared Beijing a revisionist power bent upon long-term strategic competition with the USA. His 2017-21 presidency emphasized hub- and-spokes architecture, such as US-Japan-Australia- India cooperation.
Biden's subsequent approach of "invest, align and compete" built upon this, but his was more of a latticework of trilateral and multilateral coalitions like AUKUS, the Quad and Japan-US relations and South Korea.
Sourabh Gupta, a senior fellow at the Institute for China-America Studies in Washington, noted, "None of this pleases China. In its view, the Trump and Biden administration's strategies were intended to build it out economically, isolate it diplomatically, encircle it militarily, and suppress its development technologically. The networking of alliances, partnerships and mini-lateral groupings is more an accelerant of major-power conflict than a building block for deterrence and stability, in its view. And expectations of change for the better, going forward, are minimal regardless of the victor on Nov. 5."
However, Gupta reckoned a Harris presidency would have been the lesser of two evils for China, as the latter generally prefers continuity and it is seeking less disruption.
Historically, China has done well under Democrat leaders like Clinton and Obama. Taking a contrary view was Derek Grossman, a senior defence analyst at RAND, who commented before the election: "If Trump wins, then it'll be the lesser of two evils for China. Harris represents continuity with the Biden administration, i.e. strengthening US alliances and partnerships to counter China. Trump does too, except he also presents opportunity for a grand strategic bargain. Ease up on Taiwan for a better trade deal? Maybe. Just maybe."
American awareness has grown of Beijing's desire to turn international norms on their head, and the USA has gone too far down the competitive track to turn back. Therefore, the USA will continue to discourage regional conflict with China, will promote Western values and "abiding by the rules", counter Chinese government influence campaigns, maintain a technological and innovation edge, and fight unfair Chinese trade practices.
One method in Trump's toolbox is trade sanctions and tariffs. During campaigning, Trump said of the Biden administration, "They allowed Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and others to unite. I want to break them up." Trump makes a lot of his personal relationship with Vladimir Putin, and one of many imponderables is whether he will initiate a deal to end the Ukraine conflict. Such appeasement would unfairly disadvantage Kyiv, hand authoritarian Russia a win, and fracture allied support for Ukraine. Under such an eventuality, China would also be encouraged to believe that aggression bring great reward. Against the weak and ailing West, would Chairman Xi Jinping be encouraged to use force against Taiwan?
Bethany Allen, ASPI's head of China investigations and analysis, remarked: "Trump is a wild card on foreign policy, including towards China. On the campaign trail he promised increased tariffs on China but criticized Taiwan. Anti-China sentiment runs deep in the Republican Party, but so does its opposition to US support for Ukraine.
A Russian win in Ukraine would be a major foreign policy victory for Xi Jinping, Putin's top supporter, and would make the world safer for revisionist authoritarians such as Xi." Indeed, what about Taiwan? Biden's policy has emphasized the important strategic role Taiwan plays in the First Island Chain, whereas Trump states Taiwan does not have a bearing on US interests. He has previously, and incorrectly, argued that Taiwan stole the US semiconductor industry. He also said the island should pay for US protection.
Interestingly, the Republican National Committee's 2024 party platform did not mention Taiwan at all, the first time since 1980. Could Trump flip decades of bipartisan support for Taiwan? Biden pledged American military intervention in the event of any Chinese attack on Taiwan, but it seems unlikely Trump would make such a thing sacrosanct. While there are questions over whether Trump will exact a price on China for its constant harassment of Taiwan, there is nonetheless likely to be continuity in US support for Taipei. Yet Trump will surely demand that Taiwan do far more to boost its own defences rather than using the USA as an insurance policy.
Regarding Taiwan, Sara A. Newland, Associate Professor of Government at Smith College, noted, "...US policy in the Taiwan Strait has long relied on a dual deterrence strategy intended to discourage Taiwan from declaring independence and to prevent Chinese military aggression toward Taiwan. If the new administration signals reluctance to assist in Taiwan's defence, it will undercut the basis for a policy that has helped to sustain a difficult peace in the Taiwan Strait for over 40 years."
She suggested that Trump's election might spur higher domestic defence spending in Taiwan, something necessary in any case. "An unreliable partner in Washington may push Taiwan to continue to improve its own military preparedness," Newland said.
Taiwan is putting a good face on things. President Lai Ching-te tweeted, for instance, "The longstanding Taiwan-US partnership, built on shared values interests, will continue to serve as a cornerstone for regional stability."
Putin has weighed in to support his ally China too. Doubtlessly thrilling Xi, the Russian tsar said, "Everyone formally acknowledges, yes, Taiwan is part of China. But in reality?
In reality, it is acting in a completely different direction, provoking the situation towards escalation. We do support China and, because of this, we believe that [China] is conducting a completely reasonable policy."
Trump's transactional approach to politics opens the possibility of horse trading. However, Trump's administration - replete with hardliners - could spell difficult times ahead. If such hawks emplace Taiwan as a centerpiece of their stance, this could cause endless trouble for Beijing.
Looking at Trump's picks for key positions, he has already selected well-known hawks with track records of criticizing China. Mike Waltz will be the national security adviser, Pete Hegseth's defense secretary and Marco Rubio secretary of state.
Indeed, the latter is sanctioned by Beijing, so officials will not be able to meet him unless China rescinds its sanction. Such a concentration of hostile people at the top of Trump's government may signal the direction that bilateral relations will go.
Yet Trump's unpredictability, fickleness and brashness are good at rubbing other countries up the wrong way too, so some Chinese analysts think another Trump presidency could weaken US ties and introduce fault lines with allies like Japan, the Philippines and South Korea. Reduced American involvement in Asia would help advance Chinese interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Nishank Motwani, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), said, "As president, Trump will likely reinforce foreign policy unpredictability.
This could undermine US commitments to NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, including Australia.
This in turn could embolden Russia, China, Iran and North Korea to act aggressively. Trump views alliances transactionally, favouring financial returns over strategic interests."
Raji Pillai Rajagopalan, an ASPI resident senior fellow, added, "Trump's presidency brings uncertainty, as he is unlikely to have a steady policy. It is more likely that each issue will be taken in isolation rather than as part of a strategic whole. Such unpredictability will likely scare adversaries such as China and Iran, as it did in Trump's first term. But US partners will also be concerned by Trump's shotgun approach, particularly on issues such as trade and economic security partnerships, if he does not distinguish between friends and foes."
Professor Victor Shih, Director of the 21st Century China Center, observed, "...In the course of campaigning for the presidency, Trump has relied on significant financial help from some people with major financial stakes in China, such as Elon Musk. Thus, the way that China policy unfolds in the new Trump administration may be more complicated than people had expected." Some 30% of Musk's Tesla revenue comes from China.
Those American entrepreneurs who make money from the Chinese market could prove a mitigating factor on harsher sanctions and tariffs. With volatility assured under Trump, Shih said, "Of course, many global leaders, including Chinese leaders, have come to expect this and will calibrate their engagement with the United States accordingly. China has already shown its willingness to be strategically flexible by being one of the first countries to reach out to Trump to congratulate him on his victory. The next four years may well be characterized by episodes of transactional pragmatism instead of a tailspin toward worsening ties."
Angela Huyue Zhang, professor of law at the University of Southern California, warned that a hard line could reap unintended consequences, however: "The US is likewise beginning to feel the unintended consequences of its own hostile approach toward China. The China Initiative has led to an exodus of talented Chinese scientists, many of whom have returned home. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of tough US sanctions and export controls is waning. Huawei, which initially struggled under these measures, has grown stronger of late, invigorated by state support and a firm resolve to achieve self- sufficiency. In its efforts to contain China, the US risks creating a more resilient rival - one strengthened by the very pressures meant to suppress it."
The US-China Perception Monitor, dedicated to fostering dialogue between the two countries, published a submission from Professor Wang Dong of the School of International Studies, Peking University. Wang said, "With Trump's reelection, the United States is likely to intensify its economic and security competition against China, thus bringing greater risks to bilateral relations ... New McCarthyism might again be on the rise and the element of racism might become more prominent in US policy toward China. Predictably, there will be more unpredictability, uncertainty and instability in the China-US relationship. It is more likely than not that China-US relations under 'Trump 2.0' might increasingly slip into a new Cold War."
Professor Xin Qiang, Deputy Director of the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, thought the same: "...President Trump, accompanied by hawkish officials, might turn to exert extreme pressure upon China. Such a set of policies, which has been interpreted and defined by China as 'containment, suppression and encirclement' in the name of 'strategic competition', will trigger harsher countermeasures from China."
Xi met Biden in Lima on 16 November, and a communique from China's Foreign Ministry said Biden and Xi had "jointly brought China-US dialogue and cooperation back on track."
However, Xi also drew a line in the sand for the incoming president. He said it "is important not to challenge red lines and paramount principles". And what are Beijing's redlines? Xi stated, "The Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, China's path and system, and China's development rights are four red lines for China. They must not be challenged. These are the most important guardrails and safety nets for China-US relations."
The ironic mention of democracy and human rights shows that China thinks it is succeeding in redefining these Western touchstones. China and the USA are deep in an era of strategic competition, whether they like it or not, and this reality is not going to alter significantly simply because of who is in charge of the USA.
The trajectory has already been set, and while some minor deviations may occur, the course is set. The question is whether the two countries can successfully manage that competition, or whether it will degenerate into downright rivalry and antagonism.